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Oedipus and the
Anoedipal Transsexual
Tamsin Lorraine

According to at least one version of the Lacanian psychoanalytic account of
subjectivity, a speaking subject would not be possible if incestuous desire
were not constrained by the imposition of paternal law. It is only because the
subject has been able to defer satisfaction of incestuous desire that she or he
is able to take up a position as a subject who either is or has the phallus. It
is only by going to one side or the other of the sexual divide that the subject
is able to organize his or her imaginary anatomy with reference to a privileged body part (the penis) and organize his or her desire in terms of the
transcendental signifier of desire (the phallus). This is what allows the subject to separate him- or herself from the world, take up a social position with
respect to other social subjects, and speak in a coherent and sensible way as
an "I" who can communicate his or her position to those around her. Thus
the unconscious is knotted around the secret kernel of incestuous desire that
is then displaced in the signifying chains that allow that desire to be deferred
and displaced onto more socially acceptable objects of desire. And it is that
kernel of desire that will manifest in the symptoms of the unconscious that
betray the fantasies, dreams, and obsessions the subject is not aware of on a
conscious level.
In 1972 the publication in France of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's
book Anti-Oedipus resonated with the growing challenges to structuralism
and Lacanian psychoanalysis that arose along with the political upheaval of
May 1968. In this book they argue that incestuous desire, far from being the
secret kernel of all desire, is an impoverished form of a nonlacking, productive desire that participates in the ongoing dance of life, and that human individuation requires neither an unambiguous separation of the subject from
other life processes nor the establishment of a stable ego. On their view, the
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forms that social repression and subjectivity take shift with changing historical circumstances; although psychoanalysis helpfully delineates the oedipal
subject of a capitalist social formation, other, equally viable, forms of subjectivity could emerge in concert with a changing social field. They insist
upon a notion of the unconscious that emphasizes its productive connections to the individual's milieu, and they proffer an alternative form of analysis-schizoanalysis--designed to investigate the individual and collective
flows of desire of specific social formations.
Rather than promoting a normative form of subjectivity, Deleuze and
Guattari hope to promote a subjectivity that goes past the limits of oedipalization, simultaneously bringing flows of social desire past the limits of capitalism. Capitalism's drive for ever-new sources of profit fosters innovating
flows of desire that, if left to themselves, could so alter capitalist formations
that the latter would no longer be capitalist. Oedipalization is a form of social repression that funnels the productive capacity of the unconscious
back into the constricting channels of oedipal desire. Following oedipal
subjectivity to its limits and beyond entails liberating unconscious production so that desire can create new realities. Whereas oedipal desire constitutes the subject as lacking the object desired, the goal of anoedipal desire
is immanent to its process: it seeks not what it lacks but what allows it to
continue to flow. In order to flow, anoedipal desire must mutate and transform in a self-differentiating unfolding implicated with the social field of
forces of which it is a part. Schizoanalysis is not meant to represent reality
without affecting it, but rather to participate as one force among many in the
creation of reality. The question for Deleuze and Guattari is not whether
their theory is right or wrong but how effective it is in fostering the creative
productions of the unconscious. They reject the psychoanalytic contention
that the only alternative to oedipal subjectivity is psychosis and instead explore anoedipal flows of desire and the schizo who is a functioning subject
of such desire. Their notion of the unconscious suggests ways of approaching its "symptoms" that point to possibilities for creative transformation inevitably linked with social change.
In what follows I explore Deleuze and Guattari's alternative conception of
the unconscious as a productive factory and the schizo subject able to pursue anoedipal desire, and then I consider the particular case of sexual identity. The fluid identity of the schizo allows a form of transsexuality that many
have already experienced in one form or other. The experiment a schizoanalytic approach to such sexuality makes is to ask what might happen if binary sexual difference was not the inevitable endpoint of fluxes in sexed
identity. Considering the case of anoedipal transsexuality challenges conceptions of the unconscious that take the subject as its point of origin and
presents fascinating possibilities for future forms of subjectivity as well as
collective forms of living.
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OEDIPUS AND THE SCHIZO

Gilbert Simondon, an important influence on Deleuze and Guattari's thinking about individuation, argues that the individual has traditionally been defined in terms of a state of stable equilibrium. That is, the individuated being
is assumed to be in "the sort of equilibrium that is attained in a system when
all the possible transformations have been achieved and no other force remains to enact any further changes" (Simondon, 1992, p. 302). This approach
not only excludes the notion of becoming from our thinking about individuation but strips the individual from the interactions with its surrounding milieu that make it what it is. Simondon suggests understanding the individual
as a relative reality-"merely the result of a phase in the being's development"-instead of a completed totality. Thus individuation could be viewed
as "a partial and relative resolution manifested in a system that contains latent potentials and harbors a certain incompatibility with itself'' (Simondon,
1992, p. 300). The tensions arising from the incompatible forces of a specific
phase of development precipitate the individual into its next phase of development. To capture the notion of tension at issue here, the system of the
individual's reality must be conceived as "replete with potentials" (Simondon, 1992, p. 316). It is in part because of the force of potentials in the
process of becoming that the individual moves from one state of its being to
another. Individuation entails not a synthesis that finally brings a being into
a state of completion but, "rather[,] the being passing out of step with itself''
(Simondon, 1992, p. 314). Accounts of the subject that attempt to sum up its
essential attributes fail to capture the shifting movements of its unfolding;
Simondon's account suggests that any individual is a series of metastable
states, no one of which captures the essence of what that individual is.
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze develops a way of understanding
individuals in terms of the problems inherent in a given process of individuation. Like Simondon, he contends that examining only the final states of
equilibrium in which a process results (however we may define such states)
gives us an impoverished understanding of the individual at issue. Individuals, including the human subject, would be better understood in terms of a
self-differentiating series of states comprising virtual potentialities as well as
material forms that unfold in response to the problems of life. Each state of
the series is replete with the potential to move into any number of other
states in concert with its surrounding milieu. The individual subject, on this
view, is not what remains the same throughout all the changes it undergoes
but, rather, is a conjunction of states that includes the dynamic force inherent in each state. The states of a process of individuation are not clearly defined but entail the infinitesimal movement of elemental particles toward a
limit that marks a qualitative change in an open-ended set of particles. This
limit is the virtual event or singularity that oversees the actualization of the
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series; it is the problem insisting in the unfolding of a series of points. For example, the point on a vector where water begins to boil is a singularity. That
singularity inheres in a state of nonboiling water as a virtual possibility. Although it has not yet actually manifested, it insists in that state as a potentiality, a kind of problem that will only be resolved when the incremental
movements of multiple elements coalesce in a specific way. The singularities
of freezing and evaporation also inhere in nonboiling water as virtual possibilities. Any one of these singularities only become actualized given the convergence of a whole set of forces that include processes beyond those defining the individual at issue. The virtualities of boiling, freezing, and evaporating
constitute part of the incompossible field of virtualities that condition the next
state the water actually reaches. The entire field of the virtual must ultimately
include the conditions not just for a given process of individuation but for all
of life, since all the forces of life ultimately affect one another. Transitions
across the multiple thresholds involved in a given process of individuation
happen in infinitesimal degrees that fall below the identities perceived in ordinary awareness. The psychic self and coherent body of conscious awareness, from this perspective, are the emergent effects of unstable processes in
continual movement that unfold over time and entail a field of virtual potentialities as well as the determinate configurations of material elements.
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari describe human subjectivity in
terms of three syntheses of the unconscious: connective syntheses that join
elements into series ("desiring-machines"), disjunctive syntheses that resonate series in metastable states ("bodies without organs"), and conjunctive
syntheses that gather metastable states into the continuous experience of
conscious awareness. What Deleuze and Guattari call "desiring-machines"
are the partial objects of Kleinian psychoanalysis that flow and interrupt
flow, forming connective syntheses of "then ... and then .... " Primary repression occurs when a determinate configuration of desiring-machines is
repulsed in a moment of antiproduction that resists any and all determinate
forms of production. What Deleuze and Guattari call the "body without organs" is the stasis of antiproduction that constitutes a kind of recording surface. The determinate organization of a phase of individuation is implicated
with the virtual forms it could have been. The body without organs that repulses any determinate form of the working machines of the body distributes
the disjunctions of "either ... or ... or ... " that include the virtual potentialities of the individual as well as the disjunctions that have been actualized.
While connective syntheses go from one flow to an interruption in the flow
to another flow, disjunctive syntheses distribute a network of connective syntheses across this recording surface. In the process, the desiring-machines
come to appear as if they emanate from the body without organs. That is, the
tension between the working machines of the body and the force of other
potential configurations of desiring-machines that have not yet been played
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out bring the individual into a state of equilibrium. The body without organs
can be seen as a state in which the incompatibilities of the heterogeneous elements of the individual are temporarily resolved. Instead of being the ultimate state of the individual-the essence of who that person is-this state is
a metastable state that will immediately shift into something else. The conjunctive syntheses of the unconscious connect the different states of the individual in terms of the "and ... and ... " of the states through which the individual mutates. These syntheses constitute "something on the order of a
subject" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 16). This subject may be, but does not
necessarily have to be, the oedipal subject described by psychoanalysis.
Deleuze and Guattari agree with the psychoanalytic account that the coherent body-image and sense of self of a sentient subject is the result of a
mostly unconscious process that unfolds over time. They also agree that
oedipal subjectivity is one form that human sentience can take. The syntheses they describe, however, have oedipal and anoedipal forms. Schizoanalysis is designed to foster the latter. The subject, as a process of individuation
emerging from the social field, is an inevitable coparticipant in the creation
and mutation of social formations. Deleuze and Guattari contend that unconscious investments in the social field take precedence over conscious investments in personal identity. Schizoanalysis, rather than tracing all desire
to the positions of an oedipal triangle, wants to attain "the immediate productive unconscious" that affects and is affected by the breaks and flows of
the larger social field (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 98). They characterize
capitalism as a social formation that is a process of individuation comparable to that of any other individual, including the human subject. Thus, capitalism also has a body without organs constituting the plateau of antiproduction from which all its concrete manifestations appear to emanate.
Considering capitalism from this perspective allows us to situate the trajectories of oedipal and schizo subjects' processes of individuation with respect
to the individuation of the social formation from which they emerge.
At the level of capitalist society, breaks and flows are created in the desiringmachines of labor. For example, chocolate is produced in a process that entails breaks and flows of milk, cocoa, and sugar, as well as stirring, pouring,
and heating. The productive connections of these desiring-machines appear
to emanate from the body without organs of capitalism when it appears as if
the production of chocolate is caused by the capital invested in the factory.
Capital or money is the full body without organs that resists any given determinate form of capitalist society and provides the surface upon which the
disjunctions of capital are recorded and distributed. Whatever businesses are
in operation could always be organized differently. Just as the body without
organs of the individual constitutes a metastable state of partial resolution
that repulses a given arrangement of desiring-machines, so is what Deleuze
and Guattari call the "socius" of capitalism a moment of stasis that repulses a
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given formation of the circulation of money only to unfold into the next formation. Just as the body without organs comes to appropriate a given
arrangement of desiring-machines by appearing to be its source, so does
capital come to appropriate a given arrangement of capitalist institutions by
acting as its quasi cause (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 10). The drive for
profit is the inherent problem overseeing the capitalist process of production, the virtual potentiality toward which a self-differentiating series of states
tends, that which gives a capitalist formation its mark, even when the specific form that it takes cannot be predicted in advance.
Deleuze and Guattari claim that capitalism came into being when "flows
of production" were decoded in the form of money-capital and "flows of labor" were decoded in the form of the worker free to sell her labor-power. Instead of coding (or overcoding) flows of desire, thus making sure that "no
flow exists that is not properly dammed up, channeled, regulated," capitalism "has created an axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving further and further in the direction of the deterritorialization of the socius"
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 33). That is, capitalism's emphasis on the abstract quantification of money and labor (what matters is how capital and labor circulates-not the specific form wealth takes or who in particular does
what) encourages desire to permute across the social field in unpredictable
ways. Capitalism as a social formation that seeks to replicate itself depends
on oedipalization to manage this tendency toward deterritorialization. Oedipalization entails replacing the connection of partial objects with a regime
for the pairing of people. "Partial objects now seem to be taken from people,
rather than from the nonpersonal flows that pass from one person to another. The reason is that persons are derived from abstract quantities, instead
of from flows" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 71). On the body without organs, desire is the only subject. It passes from one body to another, producing partial objects, creating breaks and flows, "following connections and
appropriations that each time destroy the factitious unity of a possessive or
proprietary ego" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 72). Oedipalization makes it
appear that partial objects are possessed by a person and that it is the person
who desires. The exclusive disjunctions of oedipalization designate global
persons "who do not exist prior to the prohibitions that found them" rather
than intensive states through which the subject passes on the body without
organs. The designations of the exclusive disjunctions differentiate among
global persons and situate the ego vis-a-vis those persons (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 78).
The axiomatics of capitalism do not care about preserving the content of
a given capitalist formation; the specific forms that places of work take with
the concomitant identities of employers and employees matter much less
than that capital flows and the market flourishes. For example, the Internet
and e-commerce are instigating a whole new way of doing business with
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new roles requiring different ways of thinking about oneself and one's function in the working whole. Such changes are not only welcomed but required by capitalism. Yet if capitalism is to replicate itself despite the mutating forms of the institutions and people who manifest it, it must make sure
that the deterritorializing flows of capital do not mutate to the point of rendering capitalism unrecognizable to itself. As a process of individuation, capitalism passes beyond itself in a series of states of partial resolution that contain incompatibilities and latent potentials. For the tensions in these states
not to rupture this process entirely (thus ending in capitalism's demise), they
must be resolved from state to state. Oedipalization is useful to the replication of capitalism because by making sure desire is always constrained to the
personalized triangle of oedipus, the inherent deterritorialization of capitalism is effectively managed. Despite the radical innovations precipitated by
the Internet, e-commerce has quickly recuperated its possibilities into business as usual. As long as oedipal subjects want to either wield or be the phallus, they identify with the social positions defined by the oedipal triangle,
and their desires are those relevant to those positions. Oedipal subjects
maintain the innovations of deterritorializing capital within the tightly bound
parameters of a personal identity and familial life (or the triangulated authority relationships that mimic oedipus in the public realm). It is Deleuze
and Guattari's contention that this is precisely the process that psychoanalysis would foster and support.
Schizoanalysis would encourage capitalism's inherent deterritorialization
to approach and move past its limit and foster the schizo subject whose desire moves past the constraints of oedipalization. Instead of referring the
body to a model of totalized body parts referred to a privileged signifier (the
phallus), the schizo experiences her body as a field of multiplicities vibrating
in an intensive field with no external point of reference or culmination. According to Deleuze and Guattari, oedipalization constitutes an illegitimate restriction on the syntheses of the unconscious because it emphasizes global
persons (thus excluding all partial objects of desire), exclusive disjunctions
(thus relegating the subject to a chronological series of moments that can be
given a coherent narrative account), and a segregative and biunivocal use of
the conjunctive syntheses (thus reducing the identity of the subject to a coherent or static set of one side of a set of oppositions).
Life itself is an activity of production. Whether a subject is oedipalized or
not, she is a process in full participation with life as process; the elements of
her body and psyche are in constant movement, making, disrupting, and remaking various connections. The conscious awareness of both the oedipal
subject and the schizo are the emergent effects of myriad processes. But
while the oedipal subject is subjected to the dominant signifier of the phallus, the schizo is able to experience her surroundings in terms of partial objects and nonspecific connections, inclusive disjunctions, and nonsegmen-
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tary, polyvocal conjunctions. She still experiences a sense of wholeness, a
sense that the various states through which she passes are experienced by
her. But the subject of her experiences is not the global person whose identity is fixed on either one side or the other of various oppositional divides
(male or female, white or black), and she designates the various pleasurable
and painful states through which she passes in terms of intensities that are
always becoming-other rather than as attributes of an unchanging being. Because her unconscious productions defy the constriction of oedipalization,
her reality is different from that of the oedipal subject; her sensations, emotions, and thoughts defy oedipal categorization. The schizo experiences the
body without organs as a "harrowing, emotionally overwhelming experience, which brings the schizo as close as possible to matter, to a burning, living center of matter" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 19). The schizo who no
longer designates the states through which she passes in terms of what is
possible for someone with her personal identity does not stop producing
connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses. Thus, she continues to
produce a form of subjectivity even if it is not an oedipal form, and she continues to experience life even if her experience defies common sense. But
while the oedipal subject experiences the world in terms of the possibilities
posited by dominant reality, the schizo is sensitive to the singularities that
could produce alternative realities. And, furthermore, given that the schizo
does not come up against the blank wall of schizophrenia, alcoholism, or
some other form of a failed or empty body without organs, her production
of this reality reverberates with and through the realities of others.
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the unconscious neither symbolizes,
imagines, nor represents but, instead, engineers. Deoedipalization would release desire from the regulated channels of oedipal desire and allow the creative proliferation of desiring and social machines. Energy, instead of encountering the blank wall of oedipalization, would produce innovative
forms of subjectivity with different ways of interacting with others and the
environment and new forms for collective living. Perhaps more importantly,
these fresh formations would be lived with an intensity and excitement unavailable to oedipalized subjects. Human beings as biological processes immersed in a living world would share in the joyfully creative processes of life
that always moves onward, generating new forms in response to the mutating forces of becoming.

SEXUAL IDENTITY AND DEOEDIPAUZATION

The sex of an oedipalized subject is consolidated through an arduous
process that entails subordinating the desiring-machines of the body to the
phallus as the transcendental signifier of desire. Anoedipal desire that pro-
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duced partial objects by connecting and breaking flows of movement is now
subordinated to desire associated with totalized persons. Desiring-machines
are ordered and synchronized in keeping with an ideal referent, and desire
comes to be associated with lack-the lack of the global person who either
has a phallus and so wants to satisfy his desire for the prized object or the
person who does not have a phallus and so wants to be the object of desire.
It is only thus that a whole set of desiring-machines can come to have one
sex or the other. But on Deleuze and Guattari's view, this one sex results
from the statistical domination of either male or female particles. Desiringmachines-presumably through some kind of analogy to the working parts
of an ideal man or woman (for Deleuze and Guattari such rigid designation
of the ultimate ideal is part of an oppressive oedipalization better deterritorialized)-.could be called male or female. Even if one has managed to attain
the persona of masculinity required by oedipalization of those with a penis,
such a "man" "at the level of elementary combinations" would have female
as well as male desiring-machines (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 69).
According to the exclusive disjuncts of oedipus, subjects are either male
or female. One cannot be both at once or shift erratically between one and
the other. But on the view of Deleuze and Guattari, the torturous process of
stabilizing a sexed identity described by Freudian theory is neither necessary
nor desirable. Yes, oedipalization requires that we commit to one side or the
other of the sexual divide; but on their view this entails an illegitimate use of
the syntheses of the unconscious. It is through the unconscious syntheses
that the fluxing processes of our body constitute a kind of whole. This whole
is not the totalized whole posited by oedipalization with reference to the
phallus but, rather, a whole that neither unifies nor totalizes the parts of the
body "though it has an effect on these other parts simply because it establishes aberrant paths of communication between noncommunicating vessels, transverse unities between elements that retain all their differences
within their own particular boundaries" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 43).
That is, metastable states of partial resolution distribute desiring-machines on
a plane that resonates with the force of virtual possibilities, most of which
will never come to pass. The body without organs renders the body whole
by establishing "aberrant paths" of communication among shifting desiringmachines rather than by integrating the desiring-machines into an organic
whole where each part has a stabilized place and position vis-a-vis the other
parts.
Deleuze and Guattari say that the schizo is transsexual (as well as "transalivedead," "trans-parentchild"). Her sexual identity is not confined to the exclusive binary of female or male (thus the pronoun she is used here only for
the sake of convenience). She inhabits a space where her proper name no
longer designates a person but, rather, "singularities flocking from all sides,
evanescent agents of production" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 77). The
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anoedipal transsexual is a faceless, transpositional subject who does not
have to blunt the differences among the positions she takes up because no
attempt is made to consolidate her identity into one final state that includes
all the actualized attributes of her previous states. Instead, she is a conjunction of metastable states-states that distribute specific configurations of partial objects and virtualities and are then joined into an incompossible whole.
Her proper name doesn't represent her but, rather, designates a class of effects within fields of potentials (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 86). This subject, rather than the effect of exclusions, is the effect of modifications that
pass through all possible predicates in an "inclusive disjunction that carries
out the synthesis itself in drifting from one term to another and following the
distance between terms" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 77). The series constituting the desiring-machines of connective syntheses are distributed in the
disjunctive network of the body without organs, and the states through
which a transpositional subject passes are experienced as intensive states in
the conjunctive syntheses. But the resulting "me" "is merely the residual subject that sweeps the circle and concludes a self from its oscillations on the circle" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 88). Such a subject has no difficulty in
moving from a state identified as "female" to one identified as "male"; she is
able to uphold the differences between the terms because she can shift so
easily from one modification to the other without excluding either one.
One might say that psychoanalysis performs a service for those made miserable about being unable to find a place for themselves within the collective structures of capitalism. But to do this, psychoanalysis posits a notion of
the unconscious that assumes that for a subject to be possible, a certain price
must be exacted. The sacrificial logic that suggests that any socialized subject must sacrifice a portion of his desires and accept his lack in order to take
up the mantle of selfhood is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, a product
of capitalism. Anoedipal desire is fully productive, and the schizo's identity,
inherently nonlacking. The anoedipal transsexual does not share the anxieties about identity of the oedipal subject. Her most secret desire can not be
represented in terms of persons: she does not want to kill her father and
sleep with her mother or sleep with her father and kill her mother. She does
not long to possess a mother-substitute that proves she has the phallus or
win the favor of the father-substitute in order to prove she is the phallus. Instead she is a resonating field of intensities hungry for connection with other
intensities. Furthermore, her identity is not the result of a process of imaginary displacements from the distribution of positions allowed by oedipal triangulation. Her identities range freely across the entire social field. Whereas
oedipalization (and psychoanalysis) suggests that the only option to oedipalization is psychosis, Deleuze and Guattari contend that it is the process of
oedipaliziltion itself that has created the false dichotomy between a constrained personal identity with its truncated unconscious and the terrifying
abyss of a complete lack of identity.
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For the transsexual able to thwart oedipalization and allow her desiringproduction to exceed the constraints of daddy-mommy-and-me, sexual identity is liberated from the illegitimate syntheses of the unconscious; connections and disconnections are made without regard for persons, identities
incompatible with the oedipalized position of the subject are not excluded,
and the pleasures and pains experienced by the subject are not constrained
to those of one who feels and wants only what is not excluded by her
membership in a particular set of compossible identities. Thus, her desiringmachines produce an anoedipal reality; partial objects are created in the immanent unfolding of connections created without reference to global persons. Instead of referring her identity to a totalized ideal in comparison with
which she must inevitably be lacking, she easily shifts identities. She lets
each state go and the next state come without worrying about whether the
state she is experiencing is appropriate for the consolidation of a substantial
self that she is supposed to be. Because the codes she uses to designate her
states are not subordinated to a transcendental signifier, they shift and mutate in keeping with the circumstances of the moment. She can identify as
her own son or father, the king of Siam, or the nomadic hordes descending
from the steppes. It is not that she has lost touch with reality; to believe that
she is the king of Siam is to assume that as a totalized whole she can be represented as being like an ideal referent. Rather, she designates her state as a
set of effects within a field of potentials in the way that physicists have designated the effects of varying relationships (e.g., of heat, power, and work)
with the name of the physicist who determined a law of interaction (e.g., the
Joule effect or the Kelvin effect)-a configuration of relations comparable to
(rather than identical with) other such configurations generates comparable
effects (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 86).
The anoedipal transsexual does not believe in representations because
she does not believe in totalized wholes. She is neither saying that she essentially is the king of Siam, nor is she saying that she is metaphorically like
the king of Siam. The myriad processes constituting her construct a body
without organs of material elements in determinate configurations and virtual potentialities that include linguistic as well as organic processes. In identifying with the king of Siam she is not representing a totalized self but,
rather, experiencing an intensive state in which dynamic potential inheres in
the sense of the words she uses as well as in the configuration of elements
of her physical state. That is, her words play a constitutive role in the intensive state she experiences. The different states through which she passes are
continuous fields of intensity that are always becoming-other. The pleasures
and pains she consumes in the conjunctive syntheses in which she experiences a self-differentiating series of states as her own are not confined to
those that can be referred to a consolidated oedipal position. Instead she
shifts through a wide range of states, experiencing the incompossible pleasures and pains of a fractured subject. The proper name she may attach to all
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the series she experiences designates an accumulation of specific effects
rather than any one essence. The pieces of the world she experiences cannot be integrated into one organic whole because its spatial and temporal coordinates are ruptured in a proliferation of incommensurate viewpoints.
Thus her narratives are splintered, her sense of time and place is skewed,
and her experience is akin to the refracted dimensions of a cubist painting.
The erotic possibilities of the anoedipal transsexual are immense. Her perceptions are sensitive to the singularities of processes normally excluded
from the disjunctions tolerated by oedipal subjectivity. Her desire unfolds according to the problems inherent to unique encounters. She sees a lizard
scuttling along in front of her on a rocky trail. She wonders what it feels like
to have reptilian skin, a long tail, to move so closely to the ground. She is a
becoming-lizard as she crouches slightly and slinks smoothly along the path,
feeling the sun beating down on her back, the heat rising up from the rocks
around her. Later, when she gets into her car to drive home, she feels the
steering wheel reverberate under her hands. She is a becoming-car as she
swerves around corners, speeds along the open road. The problem becomes
not how to move under the sun but how to keep wheels on pavement as
one's weight is shifted with centrifugal force. When she gets home, she
greets her lover. She is a becoming-other as she feels her lover's heart beat
against her breast, senses the stiffness in the embrace, the slight dampness
of arms wrapped around her. Her lover is a becoming-catatonic. She resonates with intensities that manifest stimulus-overload. The problem becomes how to ward off further stimulus. She is a becoming-catatonic too.
But her lover is also responding to her, and becomes-lizard and car, and
then is a becoming-less-catatonic. The problem shifts, what is the point of
intersection in their becoming-one? The anoedipal transsexual has no need
to reference these encounters to a substantial self grounded with respect to
oedipal relations. Her identities wander from state to state and designation
to designation. She has no need to exclude her identities of lizard, car, or
catatonic because there's no need to organize her experiences with respect
to a circumscribed set of identities (woman, daughter, and lover; professor,
citizen, and neighbor). She is free to drift from one identity to the next, partaking of the perceptions, emotions, and thoughts available to all her incompossible identities.
Of course, it is hard to imagine how the schizo could survive in our culture. In fact, we can each point to examples of strange people who do not
quite "fit" and may suffer greatly as a result; even those comfortable with
fluctuating identities are often forced by the discomfort of those around
them to conform to a more acceptable set of identity constraints. But
Deleuze and Guattari search for a different "cure" than that of enabling the
analysand to perfect a process of oedipalization that has gone awry. Their
intent is to promote the tendencies toward deoedipalization already pres-
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ent, push them to their limits, and, thus, support the creation of a social
formation able to support subjects of a completely different kind. Thus, "it is
not the purpose of schizonalysis to resolve Oedipus" but, rather, to explore
various relationships between psychic and social repression, desiringmachines and specific social formations, and to consider how to foster the
creative productions of unconscious desire (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p.
81). Deleuze and Guattari are quick to grant that the experiments promoted by schizoanalysis can be dangerous. There are reactionary as well
as revolutionary unconscious investments of desire (Deleuze & Guattari,
1983, p. 105). Revolutionary groups can and will become fascist, schizos
will go psychotic, catatonic, or reterritorialize onto neurosis. It is because
the productions of the unconscious meet the blank wall of an oedipalizing
capitalism that schizophrenia as a painful and unfortunate clinical disease
occurs. Subjects need to be able to connect with the larger social flows
around them. Being walled into their own intensities leads to an empty
body without organs that is a kind of living death. For the schizo to survive
as a nomadic subject she must make connections with other schizos. She
must make working desiring-machines with her surrounding environment
and with others that transmit fluxes and flows along lines of flight that extend beyond herself to ripple across the social field. It is only when she has
affected and been affected by others that she can become part of a reverberating, resonating field of intensities and her body without organs can
connect with the bodies without organs of others to create a plateau resonant with new possibilities. Schizoanalysis cannot simply foster the anoedipal desiring-production of a subject's unconscious, it must also foster productive connections of that desiring-production to the desiring-production
of others and the world.
Thus, schizoanalysis can never simply analyze an individual; the individual must always be analyzed as a porously responsive and responding multiplicity that changes and mutates in keeping with the multiplicities surrounding and running through her. The time and space of such a subject is
as fractured as her identity. In her free-floating associations with the world
(none of which she truly believes) her time becomes the virtual totality of all
time and her space becomes the virtual totality of all space. The unconscious
of such a subject cannot be construed as the black box of any one psyche; it
occupies the impossible time and space of incompossible perspectives and
incorporeal virtualities as well as the actualized forms of material processes.
Each one of the states through which the subject passes may actualize a specific time and space according to standard chronologies and topologies, but
on this view consciousness is no more than the emergent effect of unconscious forces that ultimately coincide with the chaos of the cosmos, the transcendental field of the virtual as the dynamic force experienced by any given
subject in terms of concrete actualizations. In the cosmic scheme of things,
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everything that is is linked by the transcendental field of the virtual that is the
condition of any actualization. The unconscious of the individual ultimately
expands to include this transcendental field while the concrete experiences
of the individual is the angle(s) or perspective(s) refracting that virtual field
in an actualized set of experiences.
Nietzsche describes the arduous process human beings had to undergo in
order to get to the point where they could make promises they could keep
(cf. Deleuze, 1983, p. 134). It is this ability to make promises that allows a
culture of forward-looking memory where what matters is not that everyone
has the same repertoire of memories of the past, but rather that everyone is
able to make a pledge to the future. The schizo and the society of schizos
that would bring deterritorialization along with capitalism past its limit would
not root their common ground in carefully homogenized recollections and
narratives of the past but would rather deliberately foster the cacophonous
explosion of incompossible creations drawn from the virtual totality of time
in ever-differing ways. Instead of demanding a coherent self with a past narrated in keeping with a standardized chronology and played out in a space
carefully coordinated with respect to the space of all other admissible subjects, the new society of schizos would pledge themselves only to a promise
of collective living. This promise would constitute a commitment not to the
shapes and forms of the past or present moment but to the ongoing interconnections that would be honored and maintained despite all the transformations to come. Such a commitment would depend on a continuous flight
from rigidifying forms in keeping with unconscious desire in its immanent
production of working machines. Rather than the narcissistic pursuit of personal gratification, such unfolding could only occur in the attunement of a
collective of schizos openly responsive to the transforming affects of others
as well as fully engaged in transformative activity of their own. It is only in
the commitment to the eternal return of a collective becoming-other that the
unconscious as the vibrant force of creative evolution could unfold in a joyous dance of communion.
There are obvious risks with such a vision. Even those with already manifest tendencies toward anoedipal transsexuality may fear the explosive results of a whole society of transsexuals. Deleuze and Guattari's celebration
of the schizo entails a deep belief in the creative productivity of the human
unconscious as well as of life itself. Life processes will always entail the stabilization of patterns of living as well as the creation of new forms. For
Deleuze and Guattari, it can only be to our benefit to attend ever more
closely to the pulse of the living rather than become fixated on past creations. Capitalism as a social formation is already reaching the limit point
where it will be precipitated into a qualitatively different state. It is up to us
to be full participants in the creation of our next incarnation.
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